Best tours to Baikonur Cosmodrome.

“At 18:45 local time, 30 minutes before the launch of the 8K-64 product, during the final operation for the launch, a fire occurred, which caused the destruction of tanks with fuel components. As a result of the incident, there are casualties of up to a hundred or more people. Including several dozen deaths.
Head. Artillery Marshal Nedelin was at the testing site. Now they are looking for him. I request urgent medical attention. assistance to victims of burns from fire and nitric acid."

Yangel Mikhail Kuzmich.

Space rockets launch from Baikonur Cosmodrome.

A major disaster at the Baikonur Cosmodrome occurred on October 24, 1960 with numerous casualties during preparation for the first test launch of the R-16 intercontinental ballistic missile. 30 minutes before the scheduled launch, an unauthorized start of the R-16 second stage engine occurred.
The first stage tanks were destroyed and rocket fuel components ignited explosively. According to official data, 74 people died in the fire. Later, four more died from burns and wounds (according to other sources, from 92 to 126 people died).
Among the dead was the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin. The disaster, which entailed great loss of life, was caused by gross violations of safety rules during preparation for the launch and the desire to launch an incompletely prepared rocket in time for the approaching holiday - the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Data about the disaster were classified, and the first mentions of it in the Soviet media appeared only in 1989.
By the end of the 1950s, the USSR had three types of strategic missiles in service - R-5, R-12 and R-7. The US territory was inaccessible for the first two types of missiles due to their too short flight range. The first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the R-7, had a range of 8,000 kilometers and could reach the United States when launched from the territory of the Soviet Union. However, it had a number of disadvantages.
Liquid rocket engines (LPRE) operated on cryogenic fuel components - the oxidizing agent in them was liquid oxygen. Preparing the rocket for launch took 32 hours. The rocket could only be fueled for 8 hours. The missile control was combined: inertial at the initial stage and radio command at the final stage.
The radio correction system included two control points located at a distance of 276 kilometers from the launch site, and allowed missiles to be guided only in a limited sector 40° wide. The missile was made according to a batch design, had large dimensions and could not be launched from silo launchers. The system turned out to be expensive, so only six launchers were deployed.
Of these, only rockets from four launchers located in the Arkhangelsk region, at the Plesetsk cosmodrome, could reach US territory. By the end of the 1950s, the United States had 40 ICBMs on combat duty.  In addition, medium-range strategic missiles were deployed in Great Britain, Italy and Turkey, which made it possible to hit targets in the European part of the USSR. In this situation, in order to maintain nuclear parity, the USSR needed to increase its group of intercontinental missiles.
Back in 1956, the young OKB-586, chief designer Yangel, took the initiative to create an ICBM with a liquid-propellant rocket engine using high-boiling fuel components (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine with nitrogen tetroxide).
This simplified the procedure for preparing the rocket for launch and significantly increased the time the rocket was stored in a fueled state. Another innovation was the use of a completely autonomous guidance system on the rocket (without radio correction at the final stage).
The government's concerns were caused by the lack of development of liquid-propellant rocket engine technologies using high-boiling components (the first ballistic missile using such components, the R-12 developed by OKB-586, had not yet flown by that time), technical risks in creating an autonomous control system of the required accuracy, and the workload of the design bureau with work on creating missiles R-14 and R-15.
On December 17, 1956, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a resolution “On the creation intercontinental ballistic missile R-16 (8K64)”, caused by the urgent need for the production of long-term storage ICBMs, despite the negative attitude of S.P. Korolev towards them.
Work proceeded at an accelerated pace. The preliminary design of the new rocket was ready in November 1957. For an expert assessment of the project, a special government commission was created under the leadership of M. V. Keldysh.
In January 1958, the commission, noting a number of shortcomings of the project, reported to the government about the possibility of creating the R-16 with the declared characteristics. Work on the rocket continued. On August 28, 1958, government decree No. 1003-476 was issued, which set the dates for the main stages of ICBM development: the beginning of flight development tests (FDT) - June 1961, the beginning of sighting tests - the fourth quarter of 1962.
By the beginning of 1959, in connection with the development of events around the so-called “Berlin Crisis,” the international situation sharply deteriorated. The country's leadership demanded that the creation of the R-14 and R-16 missiles be accelerated.
According to M.K. Yangel, N.S. Khrushchev, after listening to his report, said:
- "That's what we need. If the R-16 missile is created, the country’s defense will be put on a solid foundation.”
On May 13, 1959, a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers was issued on the transfer from the Yangel Design Bureau of all work on maritime topics to V.P. Makeev’s SKB-385. The same decree reduced the development time of the R-14 and R-16.
For the R-16, the start of the LCT was set for the fourth quarter of 1960, and the organization of mass production of missiles was set for 1962. During pre-launch operations, at the command of the combat crew leader, a number of actions were carried out from the bunker, including connecting on-board ampoule batteries and switching electricity consumers from ground to on-board power supplies.
The last of these operations was the "Start" command, which transferred control to the autonomous missile control system. The rocket began to work out its cyclogram - a sequence of commands issued by the control system, according to which the instruments of ground equipment and on board the rocket carry out their actions at launch and in flight.
The basis of the autonomous missile control system was the A-120 program current distributor (PTR), which was a shaft with cams, which, when the shaft rotated from a stepper drive, closed various control electrical circuits of the mechanisms and assemblies of the rocket.
One of the technical problems when using long-term storage of self-igniting propellant components was the tightness of the fuel system on a fueled rocket. The tightness of the fuel tanks and supply pipelines was ensured by an all-welded structure.
It was difficult to do this in the engine itself. Therefore, it was decided to separate the internal cavities of the engine from the supply pipelines using special metal membranes. Pyromembranes were installed at the entrance to the turbopump units (TPU) of the engines, the breakthrough of which occurred using a ring knife during pre-launch operations upon command from the ground.
To start the engine, it was necessary to receive a PTR command to start the engine pyrostarter, after which the TNA turbine was started from the exhaust gases of the pyrostarter and, after turning on the electric pneumatic valve, gas displaced fuel components from the high pressure system into the gas generator.
The fuel components spontaneously ignited, the engine started and returned to operating mode. To conduct flight tests of the rocket at the Tyuratam test site (NIIP-5 MO, later - the Baikonur cosmodrome) OKB-586, sites were allocated for the construction of new structures.
The test site already had a fairly developed infrastructure created for testing Korolev OKB-1 missiles. The complex for the R-16 consisted of three sites. Site No. 41 contained a launch complex with two missile launchers and an underground command post.
A measuring point was built near it. ite No. 42 consisted of an installation and testing building and other service and auxiliary buildings and structures, including premises for housing military test personnel, the State Commission, technical management and testers from industry. At site No. 43, a residential area was built to accommodate the operating military unit and industry representatives.
In August 1960, fire bench tests of the engines of the first and second stages of the R-16 began at the Zagorsk Research Institute-229. On September 26, 1960, the first flight rocket, product 8K64 No. LD1-ZT, arrived at the Tyuratam test site.
In September 1960, the composition of the State Commission for flight testing of the R-16 ICBM was approved. The Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR was appointed Chairman of the Commission Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin, technical supervisor of the tests - Chief Designer of OKB-586 M. K. Yangel.
The progress of preparing the rocket for launch was under the close attention of the CPSU Central Committee and the country's top leadership. N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev repeatedly called the training ground.
The deadlines were running out, and it was customary to coincide with great achievements on the “red” dates of the calendar - in this case, the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was perfect. The work was carried out in two shifts.
From the first half of the day until late evening, tests were carried out under the supervision of the test manager, engineer-lieutenant colonel A. S. Matryonin, military personnel and specialists from the research institute and design bureau. At night, factory specialists carried out modifications under the supervision of military representatives.
After eliminating numerous comments, the tests were completed by October 20. n the morning of October 21, the missile was removed from the installation and testing complex and delivered to the 41st site. On October 21 and 22, the docking of the warhead, lifting and installation of the rocket on the launch pad, connection of communications and testing of all systems, as required by pre-launch preparations, were carried out.
On October 23, the rocket was filled with propellant components and compressed gases. By decision of the State Commission, the start was scheduled for 19:00 on October 23. The pyromembrane system was not yet fully developed.
When detonated, a strong shock occurred, and the structure sometimes lost its tightness. The resulting drip leaks could lead to the ignition of self-igniting fuel components, and their occurrence had to be controlled manually.
An additional problem was the difficulty of controlling the operation of the pyromembrane. When the squib exploded, the electrical circuit was broken, but the combustion products often closed the electrical circuit.
This led to false signals about the failure of the pyromembrane, so the technical management decided to control the breakthrough “by ear”, based on the sound of a hydraulic shock at the moment of the breakthrough.
It was decided to break through the pyromembrane not using the on-board control system, but from the remote control in the control bunker. The membranes were undermined for each component separately, and after checking the tightness, a decision was made to continue work
At 18:00 during preparation for launch, when a signal was sent from the control panel to break through the pyromembranes of the 2nd stage oxidizer line, the pyromembrane of the 1st stage fuel lines exploded. In addition, an unauthorized detonation of the squibs of the cut-off valves of the gas generator of the 1st block of the ist stage propulsion engine was recorded. Work was stopped until the causes of the incident were clarified.

K. E. Khachaturyan, leading designer for electrical testing, recalls:

“In order to continue preparing the rocket for launch, it was necessary first of all to find out and eliminate the cause of the explosion of the shut-off valve squibs. Analysis of the electrical circuit showed that this could happen if the wires in the main distributor of the first stage control system - the A-120 device - were mixed up.
It was removed from the rocket, opened and it was discovered that the insulation of the wires of one of the bundles through which the current passed to detonate the pyromembranes was completely melted and the bare wires were touching each other.
According to the electrical circuit of the propulsion system, voltage was supplied to the membrane squibs through the corresponding circuits of the A-120 device. And while the engine engineers were “hearing and smelling” the fact that the pyromembrane had been activated, the burnt products of the squibs closed the supply circuits, a short circuit occurred, the insulation of the wires melted, and the current flowed through the wires lying nearby.
This was the reason for the unauthorized firing of the squibs. According to the technical specifications for rubber seals, cuffs and gaskets, a rocket with ruptured membranes could remain at launch for no more than 24 hours.
After this, it was necessary to drain the fuel components and return the rocket to the factory to clean the tanks, lines and rebuild the engines. Preparing for the launch of the second flying machine would take at least a month.”
During the first half of October 24, the detected defects were eliminated - the A-120 current distributor and the squib of the 1st stage engine shut-off valves were replaced. After lunch, the State Commission heard from the chief designer of OKB-692 B. M. Konoplyov, the developer of the rocket control system and control panel.
Eliminating the identified insufficient noise immunity of the programmed pulse amplifier block required a lot of time. It was decided to launch without modifications, and break through the pyromembrane manually. Upon announcing a 30-minute readiness to eliminate false alarms, the commission agreed with the proposal to reset the stepper motors of the control system to the zero (initial) position.
Apart from some specialists who objected, everyone was in favor of continuing the work. Remarks about the danger of carrying out modifications on a fueled rocket were discarded. According to the recollections of one of the participants in the events, Marshal Nedelin remarked:
- “What am I going to tell Nikita?... The rocket will be finalized at the launch, the country is waiting for us.”
The work continued. Setting an example of fearlessness, Marshal Nedelin sat on a chair at the so-called “zero mark” - approximately seventeen meters from the base of the rocket. Next to him were Deputy Minister of General Engineering L. A. Grishin, the chief designers of the rocket systems and their deputies - Yangel, Konoplev, Firsov, Iosifyan, numerous military representatives - the head of the test site, Major General K. V. Gerchik, his deputy, Major General A. G. Mrykin and others.
In total, in addition to about a hundred people needed to carry out the work, up to 150 more people were present at the launch site. About an hour before launch, the separating pyromembranes of the second stage fuel tanks were broken.
At about 18:45, a 30-minute readiness for start-up was announced and setting the program current distributor to “zero” began. Since the program distributor did not have a “backward” stroke, to set it to “zero” it had to perform a full cycle of operation.
Due to the power supply not being removed, an unauthorized start of the second stage engine occurred while passing through the cyclogram. The fiery jet destroyed the oxidizer and fuel tanks of the first stage. When the second stage engine started, automatic movie cameras (designed to film the rocket launch) turned on and captured the details of the disaster.
The concentric waves of flame emanating from the rocket spread with enormous speed and consumed everything in their path. Burning people jumped out of the fire and ran in all directions. The avalanche-like combustion lasted about 20 seconds, after which the remains of the units and structures burned out for another two hours.
Only after this was it possible to begin rescue operations. The explosion killed almost everyone who was near the launch pad. Among the dead were the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin, deputy head of the training ground, engineer-colonel A. I. Nosov, heads of the 1st and 2nd directorates of the training ground, engineer-colonels E. I. Ostashev and R. M. Grigoryants , deputy chief designer of OKB-586 (rocket) L. A. Berlin and V. A. Kontsevoy, deputy chief designer of OKB-456 (engines) G. F. Firsov, chief designer of OKB-692 (control system) B. M. Konoplev.
In total, at the time of the disaster, 57 military personnel were killed and 42 were injured, 17 industry representatives were killed and seven were injured. The deputy was also taken to the hospital in serious condition.
Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Defense Technology L.A. Grishin, who died on November 2 from his injuries. The chief designer of OKB-586, M.K. Yangel, who was absent for a short time before the launch, miraculously survived. He decided to smoke and, in order not to set a bad example for his subordinates, went to the smoking room.
Together with him, Iosifyan (member of the State Commission, chief designer and director of VNIIEM) and Bogomolov, who did not smoke (member of the State Commission, chief designer of OKB MPEI), went to the smoking room.
According to B.E. Chertok, they wanted to persuade Yangel to stop working on the fueled rocket. It saved their lives. Grishin was also invited to come along, but he lingered on the site. Yangel took upon himself the thankless mission of informing N.S. Khrushchev about what had happened. A telephone message was sent to the Kremlin:
October 24, 1960.
At 18:45 local time, 30 minutes before the launch of the 8K-64 product, during the final operation for the launch, a fire occurred, causing the destruction of tanks with fuel components.
As a result of the incident, there are casualties of up to a hundred or more people. Including several dozen deaths.
Head. Artillery Marshal Nedelin was at the testing site. Now they are looking for him.
I request urgent medical attention. assistance to victims of burns from fire and nitric acid.
Yangel
"Blizzard"-3
apparatus of T. Nedelin.
Doctors and firefighters flocked to site 41. Among the survivors, many suffered terrible burns. They were immediately sent to hospitals. The corpses were stored in a special room for further identification. It was not easy, since many of the dead were disfigured to unrecognizability.
For example, at the site of Nedelin’s death they could only find the melted star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, a watch that had stopped at the moment of the explosion, and a marshal’s shoulder strap, and Konoplev was identified by his height (he was the tallest on the site).
Hospitals arrived urgently from Moscow, Leningrad, and Rostov-on-Don throughout the night. 14 people who needed skin transplants were evacuated to Moscow, to the Burdenko Central Military Hospital. Late in the evening M.K. Yangel had a difficult conversation with N.S. Khrushchev.
When Yangel reported the death of Nedelin, the chief designer of the control system Konoplev, Glushko’s deputy Firsov and two of his deputies, Khrushchev rather unceremoniously asked:
- “Where was the technical test manager at that time?” Yangel took this as a lack of confidence in the government and asked his subordinates, if anything happened, to continue to maintain the direction of work taken.
In the period from November 2, 1960 to January 3, 1961, L. A. Grishin and three military personnel died from burns and wounds received in hospitals. Thus, the total number of deaths was 78 people. These data correspond to the list of victims compiled by the State Commission.
There are other data: according to K. E. Khachaturyan and A. S. Matrenin, the number of victims reaches 92 people, and B. E. Chertok named another - 126 people. n the night of October 25, a Government Commission headed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L. I. Brezhnev flew to the training ground. According to the memoirs of B.I. Gubanov, Khrushchev, when appointing a commission, called S.P. Korolev and asked:
- “What to do with Yangel?” Despite the fact that Korolev’s relationship with Yangel was tense, he replied:
- “This could happen to me too - new technology...”.
In addition to Brezhnev, the commission included: First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR A. A. Grechko, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR D. F. Ustinov, Chairman of the State Committee for Defense Equipment under the USSR Council of Ministers K. N. Rudnev, Chairman of the State Committee for Radio Electronics V. D. Kalmykov, Head of the Department of Defense Industry of the CPSU Central Committee I. D. Serbin, Head of the 3rd Main Directorate of the KGB A. M. Guskov, Director of NII-229 G. M. Tabakov, Director of NII-88 G. A. Tyulin.
The first meeting of the commission took place in the installation and testing building immediately after the arrival of the convoy of vehicles from the airfield. In the presence of all the surviving R-16 testers, Brezhnev stated:
- “We will not punish anyone.”
As further investigation showed, the direct culprits of the accident - those responsible for work safety and the developer of the control system - died in the explosion. It was considered inhumane to punish the survivors. According to the memoirs of Vasily Budnik (Yangel’s deputy), based on the results of the commission’s work, Brezhnev said: “... you punished yourself.”
Causes of the disaster. The main cause of the disaster was considered to be a gross violation of safety measures. The commission of inquiry established the following series of actions that led to the disaster. Preliminary breakthrough of the separation membranes of the fuel tanks of the second stage of the rocket during the canceled launch the day before, October 23.
The fuel from the rocket tanks, in violation of the instructions, was not drained.
To speed up pre-launch preparations, the on-board ampoule battery was connected prematurely. According to the instructions, on-board ampoule batteries must be connected after all checks have been carried out, directly during the start-up process.
It was decided to use an external ampoule battery and install it on board an hour before launch. As a result, the rocket's electrical circuits were energized. Half an hour before the launch, the operation of setting the software mechanisms of the control systems, in particular, the software current distributor, to “zero” began. In the absence of on-board power, this operation did not threaten anything, but in this case it led to disaster.
When the PTR shaft began to move, the pyrostarter start contacts closed and the 2nd stage propulsion system started unauthorized

Consequences of the disaster on October 24, 1960 at the Baikonur Cosmodrome.

After returning from the training ground, Yangel reported what had happened first to the first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Nikolai Podgorny, and then to the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee.
The shocks suffered affected the health of the chief designer of OKB-586, and at the end of October he suffered a second heart attack (the first was in February 1958). In mid-November, the second flight rocket arrived at Yuzhmash for modifications.
Within a month, new on-board instruments arrived. After a full cycle of factory tests, the modified rocket was sent to Tyuratam on December 28 by a special train. A test team headed by M.K. Yangel left on the same train. On January 1, 1961, the train arrived at the training ground. By this time, the following activities had been: - carried out at the site:
- security measures have been strengthened;
- proposals for “fool-proofing” were considered;
- an automatic fire extinguishing system was introduced;
- the number of manual operations is reduced to a minimum;
- the order of pre-launch preparation and launch of the rocket was changed:
- for the first time, network planning of work at the launch site was carried out - a schedule was drawn up indicating the exact time and place of each operation; due to the consolidation and consolidation of a number of operations, the number of operators and controllers was reduced;
- with the start of rocket refueling, a special regime was established - all participants in preparation for the launch wore special armbands on their arms; as the moment of launch approached, the number of persons present at the rocket decreased;
- The last to go down into the bunker, after the 15-minute readiness was announced, were specialists with red armbands.
As a result of the measures taken, no more than twenty people were near the second flight rocket during and after refueling. After the announcement of one-hour readiness, all unnecessary people were evacuated from the launch site.
Of the civilian specialists, only M.K. Yangel and the chief designers of some systems were in the control bunker. The rocket was launched from the second launcher of site No. 41 on February 2, 1961. It wasn't entirely successful.
A few minutes before the launch, a lack of power was discovered for the emergency rocket detonation system in flight and the Tral telemetry system. angel considered that the main task was to prove the performance of the rocket, and realizing that the launch was expected in Moscow, he decided to carry out it without telemetry.
The launch took place normally, although the head of the rocket fell in the Krasnoyarsk Territory instead of Kamchatka. Due to the lack of telemetry data, it was not possible to determine the cause of the deviations.
Only based on the results of the third, also not entirely successful, launch on March 3, 1961, it was established that the fuel movements in the second stage tanks that occur during flight were too large and the control system could not cope with stabilizing the rocket.
Baffle stabilizers were introduced that compensated for fluctuations in fuel components in flight. Only in August 1962 did the rocket begin to fly normally. On October 20, 1962, by government decree, the R-16 (8K64) intercontinental ballistic missile was put into service. By 1965, 186 launchers for R-16 missiles had been deployed.
Information about the tragedy was classified. There were no official reports of the disaster. All witnesses, family and friends were advised to speak about the accident or plane crash.

From Central Committee of KPSS and Council of Ministers of USSR.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR announce with deep regret that on October 24 this year. In the line of duty, Chief Marshal of Artillery Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Missile Forces, one of the most prominent military figures and builders, died as a result of an aircraft accident. Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, famous hero of the Great Patriotic War.
The funeral of Chief Marshal of Artillery M.I. Nedelin will take place in Moscow on Red Square.

News. - 1960. - October 26 (No. 256 (13492)). - P. 1.

It was impossible to keep silent about the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Nedelin, so a version was invented about his tragic death in a plane crash. The fate of the crew and other passengers was not reported.
The funeral took place on Red Square on October 27. After cremation, the urn with Nedelin’s ashes was placed with honors in the necropolis near the Kremlin wall next to the urn of I.V. Kurchatov. The funeral of Lev Grishin, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Defense Technology, took place at the Novodevichy Cemetery, and measures were taken to ensure that there were no strangers or random persons there.
48 officers and soldiers were buried on the 10th site in the park of the city of Leninsk in a mass grave. The remains of civilian specialists were sent to Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Kyiv, Moscow, Zagorsk, where they were buried without honors.
The funerals of six OKB-586 employees took place in different places of the city cemetery, without indicating the exact dates of death. Despite the measures taken, information was still leaked to Western media. Already on December 8, 1960, the Italian news agency Continentale reported that Marshal Nedelin and 100 other people were killed in a rocket explosion.
On October 16, 1965, the British newspaper The Guardian reported that the exposed spy Oleg Penkovsky confirmed the data on the disaster. Additional details of the tragedy were reported by dissident Zhores Medvedev in 1976 to the British magazine New Scientist.
The first publication about the disaster in the Soviet media was an essay in the magazine Ogonyok, published in 1989. In 1994, V. I. Ivkin, on the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces I. D. Sergeev, carried out research work in the archives.
Original documents from the State Commission to Investigate the October 24 disaster were found in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. These documents were declassified and first published in the “Chronicle of the main events in the history of the Strategic Missile Forces” and the magazines “Istochnik” and “Military Historical Journal”.
In 1999, a working group was formed that prepared award documents for the participants in this disaster. The award list lists 99 names of dead and wounded servicemen. When preparing the documents, the further fate of all those injured was examined and the final number of dead was established - 78 people, including 74 who died at launch and four who died in hospitals.
The disaster at Baikonur on October 24, 1960 was not the only one, but it became the largest in the history of rocket technology. In the USSR and the USA, during the arms race during the Cold War, a number of major disasters occurred with ballistic missiles and launch vehicles based on them.
Memory of those killed during the disaster on October 24, 1960 at the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Every year on October 24, on Gagarin Avenue in the city of Baikonur, at the monument on the site of the former R-16 launch pad (site 41 of the cosmodrome) and on the territory of the Yuzhnoye design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk, rallies are held with the laying of wreaths at the mass grave of the victims. At the Zaporozhye cemetery in Dnepropetrovsk, survivors remember those killed on October 24, 1960.
The names of those who died in this disaster, Nedelina, Ostashev and Nosov, are on the streets of the city of Baikonur. Streets in the cities of Voronezh, Mirny (Plesetsk cosmodrome), Moscow, Lipetsk, Donetsk, Odessa, Odintsovo, Shchelkovo and many other cities of the former Soviet Union are also named after Marshal Nedelin.
After the R-9A ICBM crashed at the test site on October 24, 1963, resulting in human casualties, this day began to be considered a “black” day in astronautics, and it was decided not to launch any more rockets on this day.
On this day, it is customary to remember not only the victims of the “Nedelino disaster”, but also all those who died during space exploration.

Authority:
Publications in this issue were prepared by:
Natalya Kovaleva, Sergey Melchin, Alexander Stepanov.
http://epizodsspace.airbase.ru/bibl/istochnik/1995/kat.html
ttps://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B0
_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B5_(1960)

Photos
from the collections of the Russian Archive of Film and Photo Documents.